Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II by Stephen R. Taaffe (Review)
Stephen Taaffe wrote an interesting and informative history of the primary generals in World War II. I was, however, expecting more of a biography when I began the book. I sought the book after visiting the National WWII Museum in New Orleans, which prompted a search for more information on George Marshall. The description I read classified Marshall and His Generals as a biography that focused on Marshall’s strategy in selecting generals during the military campaigns. I wrongly interpreted this thesis as a biography first with the selection process a key theme of the larger biography. In hindsight, it would have been wise for me to have read a traditional biography first before tackling Taaffe’s book. My critique stems more from the breadth of generals that Taaffe chose to highlight. I expected a more exclusive look at Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, MacArthur, Clark, and perhaps other generals who spent more years at the four-star rank. Instead, Taaffe gave a briefer look at a broader range of generals. It was still an interesting book, but the result was less of an in-depth approach than I prefer. It also read more as a recitation of facts as the author moved down the ranks to the generals who had a less significant role in the campaigns. I recommend this book for people with a deep fascination in World War II and George Marshall, but I would steer people away who are less knowledgeable about the subject. Here are some of my observations from the book
Taaffe opened his book by telling a story of a grade-school class that wrote General Marshall a letter asking about the standards he used when selecting generals. Marshall responded with character as the integral trait when choosing his team. Though not in the letter, Marshall also placed great value on education—specifically officer training at Leavenworth and the Army War College in D.C.—and youthfulness. Marshall’s experiences in WWI engrained a belief that field generals must be young enough to provide the energy to succeed in boots-on-the-ground combat. Conversely, Marshall ignored former requisites for generals like family connections and political connections when elevating officers. Finally, Marshall was willing to advance oddballs who did not fit conventional thinking—Patton being a good example. He wanted people who would stand up and fight during adversity.
Taaffe did a nice job distinguishing the role of the corps commander—solely a battle leader, a tactical commander. By comparison, a division commander oversees logistical matters. Marshall used the field commanders as the training ground for his generals.
After the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began coordinating the WWII military operations, there was a regular issue of turf wars—more focused on whether the army or navy would command, rather than the best way to win the conflict.
Douglas MacArthur was born on an Arkansas military base to Arthur MacArthur, a Union war hero. Taaffe reminded me how perilous the pacific front was after the Pearl Harbor bombing. The strategic base was largely out of commission, and Japan’s territorial expansion in the pacific isolated US troops in the Philippians. MacArthur came out of retirement to lead the pacific campaign.
MacArthur was a walking encyclopedia with charisma. His record in the Philippines was an exclamation mark for those who claimed his egomania and vanity trumped his many strengths. There, he oversold or outright deceived higher ups as he prepared the Philippines for independence. Japan’s success revealed the lack of preparations.
As Taaffe transitioned to the North Africa Campaign, he discussed the similarities and differences in how Marshall and Eisenhower selected generals. Taaffe noted that both Marshall and Eisenhower valued commanders with energy, toughness, selflessness, and youth. They both disfavored political connections and military heritage while valuing character. Unlike Marshall, Eisenhower more deeply valued recent combat experience and downplayed education. Eisenhower also proved more loyal than Marshall’s cold-bloodedness when it came to results. Still, the two respectfully worked together on personnel decisions.
During this section of the Book, Taaffe also distinguished Eisenhower from Macarthur. Despite drawing from the same pool and using the same selection methods, Eisenhower’s generals became more famous in part because Eisenhower publicized them and MacArthur intentionally kept his generals out of the limelight. Eisenhower was also more likely to engage his generals in the broad decision-making of war strategy.
Even a survey book like Marshall and His Generals highlights Fox Connors’s role in mentoring Eisenhower and encouraging him to be a life-long learner of history and military strategy. He was middle of the pack at West Point, yet he finished #1 from Command and General Staff College.
It is interesting how many of the noted generals in WWII were both west of the Mississippi.
General Mark Clark was a staff officer and deputy commander of Allied Forces in North Africa. After Operation Torch, Eisenhower promoted Clark to commander of U.S. Fifth Army and tasked him with the invasion of Italy. Naming Clark as commander was a surprising move, but this decision highlights Eisenhower’s trait of recognizing those who helped him achieve success.
General Ernest Harmon received the assignment of shoring up North Africa, after the situation reached critical levels in Tunisia and Algeria. His great success helped stabilize the situation, which led to the ouster of Lloyd Fredendall. Eisenhower then offered Harmon the North Africa command, which Harmon declined because of his role in ousting Fredendall. He then recommended George Patton for the role, which proved a great benefit to the Allied Forces.
Omar Bradley and Patton complemented each other effectively—both in personality and skills. Patton was disinterested in the non-military elements of war like logistics and administration. Bradley smoothed Patton’s rough edges, and he appreciated Patton’s aggressiveness and strategy. Despite the characterization that Patton did not care about the non-military elements of war, he took steps like precisely implementing dress codes, which drew the ire of his soldiers. Yet he did so with a clear eye on instilling the discipline necessary to build up the troops for victory.
The Allied victory in North Africa was important both from a strategic point to launch attacks on mainland Europe and from a morale standpoint. Afterwards, however, Bradley and Patton resented the way Eisenhower focused on the joint effort of the campaign under the Allied banner. During the celebration of the victory, they saw Eisenhower as Anglophilic and overlooking of the U.S. role in securing victory. Yet Marshall valued Eisenhower’s role in coordinating land, sea, and air attacks all with multiple nations joining in the fight. Marshall and Eisenhower had their eyes on the larger prize, and Eisenhower did not notice the resentment.
The generals in World War II illustrate how much your personal connections matter—be it military or civilian. The generals with long-term or meaningful connections to those in command received far more meaningful commendations and more second chances to succeed. Those that received the second chances seemed to grow into the role of commander. Contrast General Geoffrey Keyes—a good friend of General Patton who received second chances—with General John Lucas, whose amphibious attack on Italy included minimal support yet created a potential path to Rome. Lucas stayed on the beachhead to dig in and await reinforcements instead of attacking. This plan proved faulty, and Lucas had no one in higher ranks to support him. And so General Mark Clark replaced Lucas with General Lucian Truscott. No one around Clark liked him, but Marshall and Churchill did. That backing kept Clark in command. This raises an interesting causation-correlation issue. Did those who received second chances learn from previous experiences to succeed? Or were those who received the second chances rightly identified by their commanders as the ones with the mettle and intelligence to succeed? For a follow-up consideration: as Eisenhower prepared for Operation Overlord, he increasingly leaned toward battle-hardened commanders rather than rookies who had proven capable during stateside operations. This was a point of divergence for Eisenhower and Marshall, and it adds texture to the debate on how much prior experience is a predictor of future success.
General William H. Gill already spent time in the Pacific prior to joining MacArthur’s campaign. He disagreed with his role in the plan because he observed the 32nd Division was untrained in jungle warfare. I wonder how much this essential element—knowing the terrain and knowing the enemy’s techniques—hindered the U.S. in future wars. Did the success in Europe leave the country overconfident in Korea and Vietnam?
Marshall’s willingness to defer on staying as Chief of Staff rather than commanding the Overlord Campaign shows a depth of perspective and humility. Everyone seemed in agreement that he was the best person for the job, but there was no one better for the role of Chief of Staff. President Roosevelt recognized that the risk to congressional relations could hinder the overall war effort because only Marshall provided enough credibility to support Roosevelt when his plans went before Congress.
In northwest Europe, Eisenhower and Bradley gained a reputation for a quick trigger finger when eliminating commanders who failed to perform. Bradley even lamented that it was perhaps unjust to blame one man when so many things could go wrong in battle. But both generals valued accountability. Unfortunately, the effect ended up spreading a message of cautiousness. Generals wanted to avoid making mistakes to preserve their commands rather than sustaining the aggressiveness needed to win. Patton criticized Bradley’s quickness in summarily removing senior commanders from their role. He noted that people needed to learn from their mistakes.
All in all, Marshall and His Generals was a solid survey book that helped record the careers of generals that might otherwise escape a lasting record of their service to the United States. Such an outcome would be tragic for the way they sacrificed. I still prefer books with a narrower scope and a more in-depth analysis, but I still enjoyed Marshall and His Generals. There were times the book seemed more like a quick entry in an encyclopedia list of generals, but the end result is a solid snapshot of the men that served and led in World War II.
