George Marshall: Defender of the Republic by David L. Roll (Review)
Since reading From Colony to Superpower a few years ago, I’ve had an itch to know more about George Marshall. Particularly, I wanted to know more about his leadership in conjunction with the Marshall Plan. During my history classes growing up and my political-science classes in college, I repeatedly heard the gratitude that abounded in Europe because of the U.S. efforts to rebuild the countries after WWII. Yet when I first visited Europe in college, we had just invaded Iraq after the September 11 attacks, and the pro-U.S. sentiment was nowhere to be seen.
Since then, I have been curious about the perception of the United States in relation to other countries. Despite the relative youth of the U.S., its rise to power was incredibly rapid. Prior to WWI, the U.S. standing army had 127,500 officers and soldiers.[1] The navy was also undersized and outdated for a broad and modern conflict. U.S. production and strength tilted the balance in WWII and has continued since then. What I find most interesting is how we wield that power and the effect it has. Because the Marshall Plan remains a highpoint for the United States, understanding the man behind the plan seemed like a subject worth exploring.
Fortunately, David Roll’s book, George Marshall: Defender of the Republic, offered a great deal of insight on both the Marshall Plan and George Marshall. I consumed the book quickly and give it a warm endorsement. There were some curious points that were glossed over, and I would have preferred greater exploration of Marshall’s childhood and his time at the General Staff College in Leavenworth. There seemed to be some gaps during the jump from Operation Torch to Operation Overlord in WWII, and I would have welcomed more insight—perhaps through recorded interviews of congressional reps and senators—about what Marshall was so effective at winning over Congress.
This final point is one that Roll certainly addressed, but I still found myself wanting more. This pining for more insight into Marshall may have more to do with Marshall’s reticence rather than a true shortcoming of the book. Marshall seems to have been a hard man to know, and Roll still managed to provide helpful insight into the man and he did so with crisp and engaging writing. Defender of the Republic is the first meaningful biography I have read about Marshall, not counting Marshall and His Generals, a book more about the men that Marshall led during WWII. Roll’s treatment of Marshall’s life, particularly after WWII was very well done and gave me just what I was seeking regarding the rise of the United States after the Paris Peace Treaties.
The small gaps are why I give Defender of the Republic four stars instead of five, and here are some of the interesting points I learned in Roll’s insightful book:
It was an interesting choice to start with Marshall’s unexpected military leadership during war games in the Philippines. Marshall stood in to lead the white force in a mock attack of the capital instead of Colonel William Cathcart Buttler, who had lost the confidence of the war-games umpires. On one hand, this helped Defender of the Republic jump right into the action, but it made for an awkward transition to Marshall’s younger days. Recounting Marshall’s time at the Virginia Military Academy and his romantic interests after exploring WWI seemed less natural than a traditional, chronological approach.
Early on in WWI, Marshall was a Lt. Colonel who planned the American strategy for the Battle of Cantigny. The victory was of small strategic importance according to Marshall’s own assessment. Yet it had a remarkable effect on establishing credibility with the English and French. It also had an important effect on morale in the United States. The battle seems to reflect an essential trait of being able to sacrifice soldiers for a larger objective. In Killer Angels by Michael Shaara, General Longstreet described certain men as unable to shoulder the responsibility of sending soldiers to their death. Marshall’s experience as a strategist required such an ability, but it prompts the question of what allows some individuals to see the action as chess pieces on a board versus those who only see the individuals who will die. That said, Marshall also described the intimacy and challenge of maintaining composure as the Big Red One Infantry departed after a year being together.
As Germany began losing WWI, its conservative leaders began blaming socialists and Jews for stabbing Germany in the back—making a false claim that Germany had not actually lost the war. This narrative was backed by Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff. It then continued as the Nazi Party rose to power. Ironically, conservative House Rep. Marjorie Taylor Green spent this week claiming that the Nazis were socialists. The Nazi Party was nationalistic first and foremost with strong anti-Marxism and horrific anti-Semitism. Green’s claim is a playbook from the Nazis and smacks of ignorance in an effort to vilify her opponents. Her claims remind me of an excellent article I recently read called, “The Perils of 180ism: Stop blindly opposing your adversaries” by Yascha Mounk. It is dangerous for the strength of a nation when all opponents are evil, irrespective of the positions held.
Roll echoed many of the traits that Stephen Taafe highlighted in Marshall and His Generals for what Marshall sought in the men he promoted: common sense, physical strength, energy, determination, and optimism. Marshall also desired generals who were character-filled, non-flamboyant, team-players who weren’t conformists—people who could take criticism and express dissent. The non-flamboyant trait makes me curious to learn more about Douglas MacArthur who was undoubtedly flamboyant. The biography, American Caesar, is high on my reading list after Roll’s description of the famous general.
FDR had a remarkable and well-earned reputation as a charmer. When he met with Marshall to discuss his possible appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army, FDR did so with a smile and a question: “I have it in mind to choose you as the next Chief of Staff…What do you think about that?” Marshall coolly responded, “Nothing. Except to remind you that I have the habit of saying exactly what I think. Is that all right?” Marshall had a willingness to speak truth to power served him well with General Pershing first, and then to FDR. It seems to be an increasingly rare trait.
Roll provided an insightful look at the series of unfortunate events that led to Pearl Harbor’s unreadiness for Japan’s attack. He gave a sober look at Marshall’s degree of responsibility for not correcting General Walter Short’s lack of preparedness for an attack.
Marshall’s instructions to Lucian Truscott, who formed the first Army Rangers, is insightful and sound team building. Before Truscott trained under Britain’s Louis Mountbatten, Marshall made it clear that he wanted to quickly introduce American soldiers to raids that helped provide real combat experience. These individuals were then to be intermixed with green troops, so every unit had some battle experience. The raiding parties were supposed to continue growing in size to build experience. Truscott said he left his first meeting with Marshall holding complete clarity on his objectives. The combination of Marshall’s clear plan and clear communication make for an excellent method to distill confidence in an inexperienced team.
I never before heard about the inadvertent torpedo fired by the USS William D. Porter, a WWII Destroyer. In November 1943, the ship escorted the USS Iowa, which was carrying FDR, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Army Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief emissary Harry Hopkins, and other military leaders for a conference with Churchill and Stalin. As part of a naval exercise, the USS Porter accidentally fired a live torpedo at the USS Iowa. Had the destroyer not immediately warned the Iowa and provided time for evasive measures, the president and all the military leaders would have died. It’s one of those blips of history that could have changed America in untold ways.
Roll effectively fleshed out how Roosevelt initiated connections with China in hopes of developing a long-term ally and a short-term partner to defeat Japan. The Chinese Nationalist Party’s leader was Chiang Kai-shek, and he joined Roosevelt and Churchill in Cairo as part of a 1943 meeting of Allied representatives. Japan’s attacks against China made it appear that China may fall, so FDR committed to helping reopen the Burma Road, which was an essential supply line broken by Japan in 1942. This plan did not materialize, and the lack of a full air assault caused tension and suspicion that shaded American relations with China for years to come. It also burdened Marshall’s future roles in statesmanship with China and beyond.
As the war progressed, one of Marshall’s great traits was never losing sight of the highest priorities—so much so that Toll named a whole chapter, “Keep the Main Thing.”
Marshall arrived in China as special envoy with the goal of unifying the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists into one joint, non-communist country. He started at the end of 1945, and negotiations continued until 1947 when Marshall left China. The renewal of the Chinese Civil War and the assent of Mao Zedong and the formation of the People’s Republic of China factored into the Cold War and the Korean War. Later in the book, Roll’s analysis of the Korean War—in conjunction with Marshall’s experience in China—provided great context for the current situation of United States relations in Asia.
Harry Truman declared that George Marshall was the great man of their age. That’s high praise given everyone Truman intimately knew and observed during WWII and after. Relatedly, Truman said Marshall was the one man you could count on to always give you the complete truth. This was the reoccurring theme that Roll connected to Marshall’s effectiveness in gaining the support of Congress. It makes me wonder what it was that made Marshall so trustworthy that those in his presence were assured of his honesty. One must suspect that he must have lived with such a degree of honesty that he never gave reason to doubt—a trait that is rare in politics. If this is indeed what made Marshall so effective, I would love to know more about his worldview that helped him commit steadfastly to honesty in a political environment that allowed shortcuts, fibs, and wholesale lies.
The precursor to the Marshall Plan started with aid to Turkey and Greece, which were crumbling after WWII. Secretary of State Marshall and Undersecretary Dean Acheson met with Republican leaders to explain that supporting immediate aid to the countries was critical to contain the virus of the Soviet Union. Winning over the party leaders was an important first step for what was to come. It led the way for Truman’s eventual speech of providing economic and financial aid to free peoples anywhere who were resisting subjugation from outside forces. This veiled reference to the Soviet Union was a warning signal of the coming Cold War.
When George Marshall gave his speech announcing the plan that would soon bear his name, he gave the core reasons why the United States needed to act. The lead points of the Marshall Plan Speech included the obvious: loss of life, destruction of communities, farms, factories, road-and-rail networks, and the effects of nations wholly devoting efforts to war led to scarcely a framework for a return to non-war life. But Marshall also noted the problems of broken currency systems and broken transportation systems. He explained the economic interest of the United States demanded action. There were suddenly thousands of military personnel returning from war and looking for jobs; the country needed markets for the goods these former GIs would produce. After stating his points, Marshall appealed to the role the United States could play in addressing these ills: “With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.” What is perhaps most interesting is that Marshall gave no mention of the security reasons for supporting Europe. Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union were already exerting influence on Eastern Europe. Its influence was looming large with Berlin looming as the epicenter. The United States foresaw the need for its allies to regain strength as partners against the spread of the USSR’s authoritarianism and cruelty. Yet Marshall disregarded this element when presenting his message to the public for the first time.
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin heard Marshall’s speech on the radio. He came to his office the next day and demanded the text of the speech, and his staff had no idea what he was referencing. Even in the moment, Bevin immediately recognized Marshall’s vision. He soon convened representatives from Paris and the USSR to work toward a joint European plan in response to Marshall’s speech.
Roll’s book lent insight into a question I’ve long held about the Marshall Plan: why did we do it? The message I remembered from school is one of magnanimity—a point that Great Britain’s foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, saw at the plan’s heart. Yet pure generosity after a second World War seems unlikely to convince both houses of congress that such federal spending is necessary, particularly when the chambers both opposed President Truman. Marshall, however, made the point clear that rebuilding Europe served the United States at every turn. If Western Europe’s economy fell, it would be ripe for Soviet plucking. This prospect thus had a military interest that resonated: national security could not remain sound if America lost all of its allies. Finally, if the European markets resumed, it would be a fertile ground for America’s post-war production to thrive. So the U.S. would benefit financially, as well as militarily. This summary is not to say that European suffering and America’s kindness were non-factors—the historical record shows it was—but Marshall was successful in communicating all the factors at play to convince the majority of Congress that action was necessary. Truman, too, needed a dose of humility to advance the plan. Despite his administration shaping the Marshall Plan under the umbrella of the Truman Doctrine, the president insisted the plan use Marshall’s name and not his own: “We have a Republican majority in both Houses. Anything going up there with my name will quiver a couple of times, go belly up, and die.” He concluded the whole plan must be Marshall’s because “the worst Republican on the Hill can vote for it if we name it after the general.”
It was also helpful to revisit how the Marshall Plan, in conjunction with the Soviet refusal to participate, contributed to the creation of the western bloc and that element of the Cold War. One final point I either did not previously know or had forgotten is that the Marshall Plan led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The effects of America’s European aid had many far-reaching effects.
Marshall’s growth at controlling his temper was best on display after Truman arranged for Supreme Court Justice Fred Vincent to visit Joseph Stalin amid the Berlin Blockade Crisis. Everyone on Marshall’s staff responded with outrage as Marshall was working in Europe. Marshall instead responded with magnanimity and grace—slow to anger. Marshall immediately came home to help Truman balance the considerations of the international crisis and his domestic considerations amid the election race against Governor Thomas Dewey.
During the 1947 UN Assembly, as the nations debated the prospect of an independent Jewish state, one of the leading plans was United Nations Resolution 181, which passed in 1947. It called for a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem to be governed by an international collective. Marshall was one of the lead negotiators in this process, and the United States had a larger role in the decision than I remembered. After the adoption of the resolution, a civil war broke out between the Arabs and Jews, which led to the United States soon recognizing Israel as an independent nation. Marshall opposed immediate recognition of Israel, which led to a label of anti-Semitism. In addition to David Roll, Dr. Gerald Pops—a professor of public administration at West Virginia University—makes the argument that this assessment is a mischaracterization of Marshall.[2] There were numerous policy reasons to support delaying recognition. A most significant reason was his concern that recognition by the United States would undercut the United Nations, which was in its fledgling status. He was also concerned that recognition smacked of political gamesmanship by Harry Truman to secure the Jewish vote leading up to his election dogfight with Governor Dewey. There is no explicit record of Marshall harboring anti-Semitic views, but the label was extrapolated by his prominent position as Secretary of State and his arguments against immediate recognition of nationhood.
The move from president of the Red Cross to Secretary of Defense was another period of Marshall’s life where I would have welcomed more development. As busy as Marshall remained, I think it would have also been a time of reflection and perhaps an opportunity to learn more about what Marshall thought as he looked back on an already impressive career.
This final hope for more information once again speaks to how much Marshall accomplished in his 78 years of life. It is likely too much to capture in one book. Given the expanse of Marshall’s career, David Roll captured much of what made the man such an impressive individual. While Eisenhower and Patton remain a bit more famous as we drift further in time from WWII, it is clear that George Marshall should not be forgotten. Even more than this, it is clear that Marshall should remain a model for service and leadership with lessons to learn sixty years after his death. Roll helped advance both the memory of Marshall and insight into what his brand of leadership looked like. My desire for more content is a minor quibble, and I recommend Defender of the Republic for anyone who enjoys international relations and military history.
[1] The American Expeditionary Forces, https://www.loc.gov/collections/stars-and-stripes/articles-and-essays/a-world-at-war/american-expeditionary-forces/.
[2] Marshall, the Recognition of Israel, and Antisemitism, www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2015/01/Israel_Pops.pdf.
