From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 by George C. Herring (Review)
George Herring deserves recognition for this book if for no other reason than lauding the scope and ambition of his subject matter. In From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1786, Herring gives a big-picture analysis of U.S. history from the vantage of its relationships with the international community. Herring tackled the pre-colony days through the post-9/11 presidency of George W. Bush. The result is a book that minimizes traditional historical highlights from a typical history textbook to instead focus on those occurrences like the assassinations of Presidents Garfield and McKinley received only brief mention while conflicts like the Barbary Wars and the Spanish-American War receive a more in-depth focus than you typically see in a U.S. history survey. Perhaps none of these subjects strike readers as interesting, but Herring weaved an incredible narrative that was cogent, focused, and indeed interesting. I would recommend From Colony to Superpower for anyone who enjoys history, as it is a book that adds great richness to U.S. history and how we are viewed throughout the rest of the world.
I took a great deal of notes while reading this book, and here are a few of my thoughts and observations:
Herring introduced the tension that exists in the U.S. regarding foreign relations. On one hand, our formation was dependent on foreign powers, and our economy was dependent on foreign buyers. Yet there was also a sense that the colonies were casting off the old world of Europe by forming something new and something apart from other countries. This tension existed from the beginning of the country and continues today.
Jean Jules Jusserand, France’s Ambassador to the United States, observed in the early 1900s what an advantage the U.S. had with a weak neighbor to the north and south and fish to the east and west. This allowed the country to grow and prosper without having to deal with nearby threats. Yet this sense of isolation and unilateralism turned on its head after Pearl Harbor and WWII. Some historians have observed this isolation and subsequent skepticism toward international relations have limited the U.S. need to negotiate and agree upon imperfect solutions.
Benjamin Franklin had perhaps the hardest task of any diplomat who served the United States. He had an innate ability to discern the interests of others and leverage those interests into agreements.
I had forgotten the role Spain played in the Louisiana Territory prior to the U.S. purchase from France. It is not that this fact is critical to understanding U.S. history, but it typifies the challenge of maintaining a firm grasp on how past history echoes still today. Similarly, Herring commented how few Americans know anything of the Tripoli Wars. While the dollars and treaties that emerged from the conflict are minor, Herring noted how much it affected the American psyche to stand up to the pirates and successfully land a figurative punch. This marked a period when the U.S. began building a reputation as an actual factor in international affairs.
Prior to the War of 1812, the United States and Great Britain had a critical difference in their definitions of citizenship. This difference had a significant effect that seems under emphasized when looking at the history between the two nations. Great Britain held that people could not change citizenship to a new country from the country in which they were born. The United States, however, held that people could switch allegiance. The U.S. had a very easy naturalization process that allowed for dual citizenship, and this caused deeper disagreement with the issue of navy impressment.
One British naval officer during the War of 1812 observed “Self, the great ruling principle, [is] more powerful with Yankees than any people I ever saw.” This assessment seems just as true today with both strengths and weaknesses.
The War of 1812 transformed Indian relations from international affairs to domestic policy and contributed to tremendous U.S. growth. No foreign nation again allied with native Americans after the War of 1812. It also ushered in a new era of boldness within the U.S. The Royal Navy kept the oceans safe, which allowed the U.S. shipping to remain safe and surge in power without devoting resources to a standing navy. The vast natural resources quickly became valuable abroad, which built significant economic growth.
During the time of Andrew Jackson, American diplomats were republican to the core by taking pride in their plain, simple American dress. The New York Post editorialized: “the person who represented his nation abroad should look like an American, talk like an American, and be an American example.” This observation on American diplomacy is a start contrast to Anthony Bourdain’s comments when I heard him speak in Chicago: “Americans need to be better guests.”
The South maintained the British abolitionist movement was a sinister plot for British reclamation of the United States. The conspiracy theory went that eliminating slavery would ruin the South’s economic capacity, which would cause the U.S. to topple and this allow for British dominion.
William Henry Harrison, 9th President for 31 days, was Minister to Colombia in 1828 to 1829. I had forgotten that—years later—the United States facilitated Panama’s uprising from Colombia to secure the land for the Panama Canal. Later still, Woodrow Wilson apologized to Colombia for its role in the Panamanian revolution and offer monetary compensation. This action caused outrage in the U.S. and applause in Latin America.
William Seward has brash tendencies but served as an effective diplomat during the Civil War. He was threatening enough to satisfy the citizenry at home but had the wisdom to compromise with foreign powers when needed.
The Confederacy neglected diplomacy and was convinced it was a minor element of independence from the Union. John J. Pettus, Governor of Mississippi, declared, “...the sovereign State of Mississippi can do a great deal better without England than England can do without her.” The South thought cotton would win over foreign countries, yet slavery was a roadblock to support. Instead of bartering with cotton to gain support, it instead used a cotton embargo. Embargoes take time to work, and the Confederacy did not have time. Eventually, new sources like Egypt allowed cotton to enter the marketplace. Further, any interest in helping the Confederacy ceased due to slavery. European powers explicitly stated it would not back slavery.
The Civil War extended to Alaska and Hawaii. The CSS Shenandoah attacked whaling ships off both coasts toward the end of the Civil War.
I had forgotten that Cuba was a U.S. annexation after the Spanish-American War. It was interesting hearing how Americans viewed the war as something done for Cuba. Cubans viewed the war as something done to them—not an act of liberation from Spain as the U.S. rhetoric suggested. Still, the war had significant effects in America by serving as a point of unification for the North and the South after the Civil War. The liberation of Cuba brought both sides together. It also entered America into the world of colonialism and ushered in the Century of America by changing the course of Spain, Cuba, the Philippines, and China.
Secretary of State John Hay was a private secretary to President Lincoln. He later served as Secretary of State under Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt. The latter presidencies seem like a different era than that of Lincoln. Certainly only a few decades separated them, but it’s striking to think of the technological and cultural changes that occurred during Hay’s time of service.
At the end of WWI—after the League of Nations had failed—former Secretary of State Elihu Root observed in 1922, “Americans had learned more about international relations within the past eight years than they had in the preceding 80 years—and they were only at the beginning of the task.” Woodrow Wilson’s efforts in international relations shaped this learning and the U.S. approach to foreign policy for decades to come. Wilson helped make the United States an international power, and this growth occurred just as America became a true economic power.
After WWI, the U.S. provided famine relief for Russia, which proved to prop up Lenin’s communist government. The U.S. also provided expansive disaster relief for an earthquake-torn Japan. Japan noted the forgiveness of past offenses by the U.S. as it acted with magnanimity. In both instances, the recognition of the generosity faded quickly. The author noted that “gratitude is fleeting in international relations as it is in ordinary life.” Of course, in both cases the U.S. simultaneously played the role of bad actor and generous actor in the mind of Russians and the Japanese. While neither aid had requirements attached to the gift, the U.S. was working to undermine communism in Russia and adopted harsh anti-immigration policies toward Japan. Both stances caused long-term rifts as the countries moved towards WWII.
One way that the Great Depression and WWII transformed the United States was the realization of how much the world had shrunk. It made Americans realize that isolationism was not enough to protect its interests and—particularly after France fell to Germany—it was in the country’s best interests to work with and defend allies.
There are endless writings analyzing—and often critiquing—America’s isolationism and wariness of entering WWII, but Herring painted a clear picture why this hesitancy occurred. He connected war weariness after WWI and the broken confidence and domestic ills from the Great Depression. The combination left not just policymakers against entering the fray but average Americans, too.
After FDR implemented his lend-lease program with Great Britain, he sharply increased the zone of defense for America’s borders. He began by bringing Greenland under U.S. protection as a way to maintain critical shipping lanes. This prompted citizens to think about and discuss national security in ways that had not been part of the national psyche since the early days of the republic.
Churchill observed that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.” Herring followed this quote by arguing that coalition warfare is a marriage of convenience to obtain a specific purpose—often urgent needs. Rarely do such alliances last after attaining the purpose and the alliances often contain built-in conflicts. The United States, Great Britain, and USSR collaborated because of Hitler, but the three allies suspected each other.
Though the Big 3 of the U.S., Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. receive the thrust of attention when looking at U.S. foreign relations in WWII, Herring noted that the United States took broad and diverse action on many fronts during the war. The country focused on defeating the Axis, but there were post-war eyes set on strategy and economic interests, which led to efforts in Latin America, China, and the Middle East.
Herring spent time analyzing the U.S. role on the international stage after WWII, as the country shifted focus from winning the war to securing the peace. The distinction between the two concepts may highlight the greatest challenge our country has faced in its history. We have won wars going back to our shift from colonies to country, yet figuring out what to do next seems far harder. How do you govern when the enemy is defeated physically but not ideologically? Herring mention former Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, an individual whose name I could not have recalled even as someone who regularly indulges in U.S. history. Herring criticized Hurley as a clown (using other officials’ own words)—one whose lack of diplomacy and respect toward other cultures had meaningful effects of setting back U.S.-China relations. Hurley’s conduct included racist nicknames and bellowing a Cherokee war cry while serving as U.S. diplomat in the region. Hurley’s words and actions contributed to the civil war in China and the Red Scare with the East. Going back to my observation on the struggles of securing peace, you can’t help but wonder if the U.S. shifting attention away from international relations after it wins a battle ends up causing more long-term damage than the initials conflicts.
WWII had an incredible globalizing effect on Americans. It caused large numbers of the population to travel abroad; the returning soldiers subsequently believed the United States had a role to play in global leadership. Prior to the war, few Americans had international experience upon which to draw and form opinions. But after the war, isolationism largely went by the wayside.
The early years after WWII bred confusion and misunderstandings between the U.S. and the USSR. State officials and Truman often over emphasized developments that suggested Soviet wrongdoing and minimized acts that rightly caused Soviet concern. This pre-Cold War tension led to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA and ushered in an era of agency leadership in the international arena for years to come.
It is remarkable reviewing the history of U.S. involvement in Korea and see how the echoes of the Korean War still reverberate today. Reading about the Kim Dynasty and Kim Il-Sung’s invasion of South Korea in 1950—particularly how it entangled us with the USSR and China—proves just as timely as it must have seemed in the 1950s. It seems the Korean War had as much to do with the U.S. becoming a perpetual military state as did WWII.
When Stalin died, there was concern about his replacement being even more tyrannical. The United States, however contributed to the Cold War’s tensions. After WWII ended, the U.S. began opening military bases in other countries around the globe. Soviet leaders felts like they were surrounded and that the U.S. might initiate war to prevent the post-Stalin transfer of power. It’s impossible to comprehend another country opening a military bar on U.S. soil, yet we take for granted the 80+ military bases in other sovereign nations.
There are so many international events that were critical and significant in the moment—some lasting for years—that do not remain part of the public psyche. The Suez Crisis and the conflict in the Middle East was a minor note for me in American history. Perhaps because the U.S. did not engage militarily is why the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain, and France followed by the subsequent role as mediator (or traffic cop, given the threat of force) did not leave the same historical impression as other crises. Yet the risk of U.S. military action and perhaps even nuclear action with the Soviet Union seems like the event should receive greater focus, particularly as the Middle East remains such a critical point of tension today.
During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, it is surprising to look back on the optimism or arrogance of the U.S. in thinking it could become the puppet master of countries simply by assassinating leaders or backing rebel insurrections. While there are examples of this approach working—see Italy’s 1948 elections and the political warfare waged by the Truman Administration—the long-term ramifications were far more damaging than any short-term benefits—perhaps reminiscent of U.S. outrage in response to Russia’s interference with the 2016 elections. Conversely with Italy in 1948, the Bay of Pigs invasion is the worst example of U.S. interference. The 1950s ushered in an era that makes one hearken back to the Monroe Doctrine and avoiding entanglements. I don’t offer this thought as an argument for isolationism but instead some political philosophy that better veers away from active interference.
LBJ commented that he “didn’t want to be known as a war president.” Yet the Vietnam War proved to be a central element of his presidency. The effect was to unravel his Great Society. This highlights how limited a president’s control can be on the events that shape a presidency. To be sure, LBJ made Vietnam into a war zone, but he inherited significant problems there from previous administrations.
LBJ’s effort to placate the Shah of Iran led to short-term gains and long-term damages. As Herring put it, LBJ hastily constructed arms deals to keep the Shah from joining the USSR. This illustration seems to be a consistent theme that quick and unilateral actions tend to have poor results.
Even having read somewhat thoroughly on Nixon and Kissinger, I did not realize that President Nixon embraced the Madman Theory. Herring described an anecdote of Nixon telling aids to use the idea that he was a hardliner with his hands on the nuclear codes.
Chile’s elections and the immediate support to General Augusto Pinochet after his military coup is a good example of U.S. involvement that leaves generations who distrust or even despise the United States. The reason these types of examples are so disconcerting is that we don’t remember the history. What is significant to the countries we affect is insignificant to our nation’s history. This forgetfulness is lamentable and should not be our approach to international relations.
At the end of the book, Herring notes the shift of power from military to economic—citing the EU and China as technology and economic rivals to the U.S. Such a focus makes for a significant shift compared to the vast majority of his book which painted the U.S. as an independent country departed by oceans after the American Revolution. American went from the greatest creditor to the greatest debtor due to the War on Terror.
As suggested by these notes, Herring covered an impressive amount of content. Yet the book moved at a brisk pace due to the author’s compelling narratives. I thoroughly enjoyed From Colony to Superpower, and it prompted other new books joining my reading list. As readers might expect, this is a survey analysis with a brief look at many subjects. But the unique perspective of focusing primarily on the policy effects in relation to other nations makes American history seem fresh and worthy of continued exploration. I recommend From Colony to Superpower with great enthusiasm.
